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31 August 1962



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1



2. USSR-Berlin: USSR again attempting to induce Bonn toward more favorable view of four-power negotiations on Berlin. (*Page ii*)

25X1



5. Cambodia: Sihanouk's call for conference on Cambodia receives little support from nonaligned countries. (*Page iv*)
6. USSR-Indonesia: Moscow continues to fulfill military aid commitments to Indonesia. (*Page v*)
7. France - West Germany: Bonn security authorities concerned that French nationals may attempt De Gaulle assassination during forthcoming state visit. (*Page vi*)
8. Algeria: Ben Bella stakes his prestige on breaking Wilaya IV's hold on Algiers. (*Page vii*)
9. Ghana: Cabinet changes should reduce pro-Communist influence in Nkrumah regime. (*Page vii*)

(Continued)

31 August 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS
(Continued)

25X1

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11. Jordan - Saudi Arabia: Joint military command and policy coordination to have little practical significance. (*Page viii*)
 12. Argentina: New flare-up of factionalism in army further threatens Guido's position. (*Page viii*)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006500520001-2

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006500520001-2

USSR-Berlin: [The USSR has renewed efforts to induce the Adenauer government to adopt a more favorable attitude toward four-power negotiations on Berlin and Germany and to stimulate West German interest in a direct approach to Moscow on these problems.]

[In talks last week with officials of the Free Democratic Party and with West German correspondents, Soviet Embassy officials in Bonn took the line that the prestige which the USSR gained from its recent space achievements has reduced pressures on Moscow for an early Berlin settlement. The Soviet spokesmen indicated that, although the Soviets will not wait indefinitely, they would "go along" if the West were willing to engage in "true negotiations." They complained about Adenauer's unwillingness to sanction four-power talks and hinted that the Berlin wall could be dismantled if a Berlin solution is achieved.]

25X1

25X1

[] Khrushchev believes the present impasse can be overcome only by another meeting with President Kennedy. He warned that since the West seems unwilling to improve the Berlin situation, the USSR would have to bring the problem before the UN and demand that Western troops be removed from the "powder keg."

[These overtures probably are designed to convey the impression that the Soviet leaders are not committed to any firm deadline for signing a separate peace treaty and that they would be willing to postpone any final decision for some time if there is a change in the Western attitude toward negotiations.]

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
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25X1

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Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk's call on nations participating in the Geneva conference on Laos to hold another conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality has received little support beyond prompt endorsement by Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi.

25X1



The Indian ambassador in Phnom Penh has told US officials that New Delhi was disappointed that India was not consulted beforehand. The initial Burmese reaction was negative.

Sihanouk, meanwhile, has indicated that he might settle for unilateral guarantees of Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity from the countries concerned.

25X1

31 Aug 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

USSR-Indonesia: Indonesia reportedly has been seeking ways to cut back Soviet military assistance now that the West New Guinea agreement has been signed. Moscow, however, is continuing to fulfill its military aid commitments to Indonesia.

A Kronshtadt-class submarine chaser, a small mine sweeper, and two torpedo recovery craft, all under tow by merchant ships, departed the Black Sea earlier this week and are apparently bound for Indonesia.

25X1 [Preparations for developing surface-to-air missile sites in Indonesia are also under way. Surveys for these sites have been completed in the Surabaya area and locations for three sites in the Djakarta area have been selected. Construction of the latter reportedly is to be completed by mid-October.] 25X1

31 Aug 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

France - West Germany: [West German authorities are taking extraordinary security measures against a possible assassination attempt by French nationals during De Gaulle's scheduled 4-9 September state visit.]

25X1

[Their concern springs largely from the continuing activities of Secret Army Organization (OAS) leaders, such as ex-colonel Argoud, who reportedly again toured French military units in Germany last month drumming up support among pro-OAS officers. German deserters from the Foreign Legion, many of whom have taken leading roles in OAS terrorist activities, increase the danger.]

[De Gaulle now has reportedly agreed to let the regular French security services--rather than the presidential staff--take responsibility for his personal safety. His habit of mingling freely with crowds during his public appearances, however, tends to vitiate security precautions.]

25X1

31 Aug 62

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

Algeria: Ben Bella, by appealing to Algerian National Army units loyal to him to enter Algiers and establish the authority of the political bureau, has staked his prestige on breaking Wilaya IV's hold on the city. Spokesmen for Wilaya III and Wilaya IV have said that they no longer recognize Ben Bella's political bureau, and Wilaya IV leaders have announced that they will defend Algiers.

The military forces at Ben Bella's disposal are superior to those of Wilaya IV, and Wilaya III's troops will probably not be committed to defend Algiers. Nevertheless, a quick decision is not assured. The restiveness of the Algiers populace, frustrated over unemployment and the lack of effective government, and pressure from middle level Algerian officials, disgusted with political bickering, could still force Ben Bella to compromise.

25X1

Ghana: / Nkrumah's dismissal and detention of two cabinet members and a high official of his party on 29 August should have the effect of reducing the influence of the pro-Communist bloc faction in his regime. The action appears to be related to the abortive attempt on Nkrumah's life earlier this month, however, and probably does not reflect a shift to the right in Nkrumah's thinking.

25X1

[One of the dismissed ministers has been among the regime's most militant left-wingers. A short time ago he appeared to wield greater influence than any other cabinet member. The party official is also well known as a pro-Soviet mouthpiece. The other ex-minister is a moderate who was never a member of the regime's inner circle.]

[Recent reports suggest that other cabinet changes may be imminent.]


25X1

31 Aug 62

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1



Jordan / Saudi Arabia: The establishment of a joint military command and the coordination of political and economic policies announced by King Husayn and King Saud are unlikely to have much practical significance.

These moves are a product of their common antipathy to Nasir, who has been backing plotters against both monarchs. Husayn presumably hopes that he will obtain Saudi financial aid as a result of the moves. Similar joint commands have been established by Arab states on various past occasions to attempt to demonstrate unity.


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
Argentina: [A new flare-up of factionalism in the Argentine Army threatens President Guido's already tenuous position.]

25X1



[The army commander in chief, associated with the faction that rebelled early this month, has relieved General Ongania from command of the key cavalry corps stationed near Buenos Aires, which had supported the Guido regime.]

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